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Facts  
The matter came to the Constitutional Court by referral from the High Court. The Applicant applied for 
leave to issue judicial review process and leave was granted by the High Court. While the main 
application for judicial review was still pending, the Respondent filed an application to discharge the 
leave granted to the Applicant. The Applicant opposed this motion and then applied to have the matter 
referred to the Constitutional Court for the determination of the following questions: 
 
1. Whether in light of the provisions of Article 118 of the Constitution, judicial review 
proceedings are still subject to grant of leave; and  
2. Whether in light of Article 118 of the Constitution, leave to commence judicial review 
proceedings granted prior to 5 January 2016 can be discharged.  
 
Holding 
 
1. The requirement to first obtain leave before one can institute judicial review proceedings is an 
important tool by which the court is able to prevent the impediment of the smooth running of 
government institutions as well as the halting unnecessarily of government policies and 
decisions that can result from having to hear and determine frivolous and vexatious cases. The 
leave stage enables the court to stop the influx into the court system of unmeritorious cases that 
would assume the courts resources only to be dismissed later on the ground that they are 
frivolous or vexatious.  
 
2. The phrase ‘undue regard to technicalities’ means placing reliance on or giving heed to a minor 
detail or point of law which is part of a broader set of rules that govern the manner in which 
court proceedings are to be conducted which does not go to the core of the whole court process. 
 
3. Article 118(2)(e) of the Constitution does not proscribe adherence to procedural rules or 
technicalities as what it proscribes is paying undue regard to procedural technicalities that result 
in a manifest injustice. Article 118(2)(e) does not proscribe the requirement for leave before 
issuing judicial review process in judicial review matters. The requirement to first obtain leave 
of the court before issuing judicial review process still subsists and it does not violate the 
provisions of Articles 118(2)(e) and 134 of the Constitution.  
 
Significance 
For ease of reference, Article 118(2)(e) requires the Courts, in the exercise of judicial authority, to be 
guided by the principle that ‘justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural 
technicalities.’ The decision of the Constitutional Court is problematic on many fronts. The Court took 
the view that the requirement for obtaining leave prior to issuing judicial review process is both a 
procedural and substantive rule. According to the Court, this is because the leave requirement can be 
dispositive of a judicial review matter. In the words of the Court: 
 
For the foregoing, it is clear that the requirement to first obtain leave before one can institute 
judicial review proceedings is an important tool by which the court is able to prevent the 
impediment of the smooth functioning of government institutions as well as the halting 
unnecessarily of government policies and decisions that can result from having to hear and 
determine frivolous and vexatious cases. The leave stage also enables the Court to stop the 
influx into the Court system of unmeritorious cases that would consume the Court’s resources 
only to be dismissed later on grounds that they are frivolous or vexatious. 
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The import of this holding is that if a technical rule or procedure is capable of disposing a matter then 
it does not offend Article 118(2)(e) of the Constitution. However, to hold this way is a misdirection on 
the part of the Court. It is a position that shows very little appreciation of the historical roots of Article 
118(2)(e) and an example of constitutional adjudication that is ‘outcomes-based decision-making’1 as 
opposed to principled adjudication. Article 118(2)(e) of the Zambian Constitution was transplanted 
verbatim from Article 159(2)(d) of the Kenyan Constitution of 2010. Its inclusion in the Kenyan 
Constitution was actuated largely by the fact that prior to 2010, no single presidential election petition 
was ever head on merits in Kenya. They were all systematically killed off by the courts on procedural 
technicalities. A few case examples could illustrate this problem. Mwai Kibaki vs. Daniel Toroitichi 
Arap Moi Court of Appeal Civil Application No. 172 [Election Petition No.1of 1998] was a presidential 
election petition brought by then main opposition candidate Mwai Kibaki against the election of 
President Daniel Arap Moi, following Kenya’s 1997 elections. Mwai brought an action to void the 
election for several electoral malpractices violating electoral rules. The petition, however, was thrown 
out on procedural technicalities to do with the service of the petition. 
 
The petitioner had served the petition by way of publication in the government Gazette, since the 
respondent had not furnished details of his advocates as provided for in the rule.  The petitioner did not 
effect personal or direct service as required by the relevant rules because the respondent, as president 
‘is surrounded by a massive ring of security which is not possible to penetrate.’2 The court held that the 
rule did not compel the respondent to provide contact details of his advocates. According to the court, 
service through publication in Gazette would only apply if the option of personal service, service 
through advocates and/or registered mail had been attempted and failed. Only then could a petition be 
presented by way of publication in the Gazette, and because this was not done, then the petition failed 
and the court dismissed it for improper service.3 
 
In the Kenyan context, this was not an isolated incident but was a systematic way the judiciary took to 
killing off presidential election petitions without hearing the merits. For example, following the 1992 
presidential elections, losing opposition candidate, Kenneth Matiba brought a petition challenging the 
election of Daniel Arap Moi.4 However, before the election, Matiba became physically incapacitated 
and unable even to write, and, therefore, unable to personally sign the election petition as required by 
the rules of service. The petition was signed by his wife, who he had given power of attorney. The court, 
however, struck the petition for failure to sign the petition personally by the petitioner.5  
 
What is clear from these cases is that adherence to existing procedures were dispositive of the cases. 
Yet that was problematic, as the merits of the cases were never weighed. The 2010 Constitution, 
therefore, deliberately included Article 159(2)(d) to overcome that. It is not about how useful or 
dispositive a procedural rule is. To hold, as did the Constitutional Court, that a procedure that is 
dispositive of a case is consistent with Article 118(2)(e) is to miss the substance of the provision. 
As already noted, the decision is outcome based as opposed to principled adjudication. Under outcome 
based adjudication, the court thinks of the possible consequences of its decision and if it does not like 
the consequences, it decides the case before it in a manner consistent with an outcome it prefers.6 It is 
an approach that is based on ‘suppositions, conjecture or convenient assumptions.’7 In arriving at the  
decision to sustain the rule requiring leave, the Constitutional Court based its decision not on the 
articulation of the principles underlying Article 118 but on the filtering function of the rule and  its 
                                                          
1 Cora Hoexter, ‘South African Reserve Bank v Shuttleworth: A Constitutional Lawyer’s Nightmare’ (2016) 
VIII Constitutional Court Review 348 
2 Ibid p.18 
3 Ibid p. 17-19 
4 Kenneth Stanley Matiba vs. Daniel Toroitichi Arap Moi and others Civil Application No.NAI 241 (1993) 
[Election Petition No.27 of 1993]. See also Handbook on Election Dispute in Kenya: Context, Legal 
Framework, Institutions and Jurisprudence (2013) 
5 Ibid   
6 Michael Tsele, ‘Coercing Virtue in the Court: Neutral Principles, Rationality and the Nkandla Problem’ (2016) 
VIII Constitutional Court Review 196 
7 Ibid, 216 
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capacity to dispose of unmeritorious claims in applications for judicial review. This outcome is not 
based on the reading or analysis of Article 118(2)(e) as this Article does not save a procedural rule 
merely on account of its supposed utilitarian value. It is hard to actually think of a procedural rule that 
would not meet the utility or dispositive value criteria set by the Constitutional Court in this case.  
On the other hand, principled adjudication is grounded in the neutrality and generality of the reasons of 
the decision marker. Herbert Wechsler correctly described what constitutes principled adjudication: 
 
A principled decision, in the sense I have in mind, is one that rests on reasons with respect to 
all the issues in the case, reasons that in their generality and their neutrality transcend any 
immediate result that is involved.8 
 
In principled adjudication, it is not the role of the Court to worry about the likely consequences of their 
decision to government institutions, provided their decision is well reasoned and wells-up from correct 
interpretation of constitutional principles. In focusing on the supposed utility of the leave rule, the 
Constitutional Court failed to transcend the particularities of the case before it in order to articulate a 
broad framework that would inform litigants in advance when a particular rule of procedure would 
offend Article 118(2)(e) of the Constitution. Serving a procedural rule on account of its supposed utility 
value is to say nothing of value as every procedural rule was created for a purpose. 
The Constitutional Court further held that the rule requiring leave before issuing judicial review process 
is both procedural and substantive, and is, therefore, ‘part and parcel’ of the application for judicial 
review. The Court seemed to think that judicial review is inconceivable without the rule requiring leave 
of Court. Shockingly, the Court went further to assert that because of the filtering function the leave 
rule plays, it is ‘not tenable at law’ to have it nullified (or perhaps even modified). This is incorrect and 
demonstrates limited appreciation of the plenitude of the practice of judicial review across the common 
law world. Judicial review is not dependent on the leave requirement. There is no necessary connection 
between the two. Several common law jurisdictions allow judicial review applications without requiring 
prior permission of the Court to proceed. For example, there is no leave requirement for judicial review 
proceedings in Canada, New Zealand, Australia, and Scotland.9 It is, therefore, completely misleading 
to hold that the requirement for leave is ‘part and parcel’ of judicial review. Even under English law, 
from which the rule was inherited, the rule around leave is more nuanced and does not apply, for 
example, to statutory judicial review which imposes six-week time limits.10 
 
It would appear that the Constitutional Court believes it is the duty of the judiciary to limit scrutiny of 
the government by its own citizens through judicial review. To the Constitutional Court, the rule for 
obtaining leave is necessary in order to ‘prevent the impediment of the smooth functioning of 
government institutions.’ What about the doctrine of equality before the law? The authors Wade and 
Forsyth have stated that ‘it seems wrong to impose this requirement in proceedings against public 
authorities, who ought not to be treated more favourably than other litigants.’11 There is something 
fundamentally wrong about affording the government institutions this filter which is not available to 
every other litigant. As the Australian Administrative Review Council stated, ‘it is difficult to justify a 
leave requirement in public law cases when no such requirement exists in other civil litigation.’12 The 
Council took the view that the leave requirement adds to the expense and complexity of litigation to the 
disadvantage of applicants with legitimate causes of action.13  
 
The decision of the Constitutional Court, in shielding the government institutions, elevates the 
government above the governed, an outcome that offends the concept of the rule of law, which at its 
                                                          
8 Herbert Wechesler, ‘Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law’ (1959) 73 Harvard Law Review 19 
9 HWR Wade and CF Forsyth, Administrative Law ( 11th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 554 
10 Ibid, 553 
11 Ibid, 553 
12 Administration Review Council, ‘Review of the Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977: Stage 
One’ (Report No 26, 1986) para 66 
13 Ibid 
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barest minimum, requires that the governors and the governed to be subject to the same rules.14 The 
Court should not have the duty to act as a gate keeper on behalf of government against its own citizens 
nor a supplicant on behalf of public authorities. The mandate of the judiciary in Article 118(1) of the 
constitution is simply to administer judicial authority in a just manner that promotes accountability. 
That is all. 
 
The case demonstrates the inability of the Constitutional Court to transcend insular jurisprudence that 
promotes a culture of subservience to the executive. It demonstrates reluctance on the part of the Court 
to articulate ground breaking, innovative and progressive jurisprudence that does not see the 
government as elevated above its people but as a servant of the people and entirely answerable to the 
people, no matter how unwarranted the questions the people may ask. This has been a general problem 
affecting many judiciaries in Africa. Prempeh aptly described this problem when he stated: 
 
The result, in the African context, is what I have called a ‘jurisprudence of executive 
supremacy’- a jurisprudence that is unduly deferential to executive power, and, at best sceptical 
of ‘novel’ claims rooted in modern conceptions of constitutionalism.15 
 
This case presented the Constitutional Court an opportunity to articulate clear principles underlying the 
adoption of Article 118 and enable litigants in advance how their claims will be settled in relation to 
the provision. It was an opportunity to break ground for a new jurisprudence that articulates the new 
Constitutional norms in the amended Constitution. Sadly, the opportunity was squandered. 
 
                                                          
14 Stu Woolman, ‘Understanding South Africa’s Aspirational Constitution as Scaffolding’ (2015/2016) 60 New 
York Law School Law Review 286 
15 H Kwasi Prempeh, ‘Presidential Power in Comparative Perspective: The Puzzling Persistence of Imperial 
Presidency in Post-Authoritarian Africa’ (2008) 35 Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 829 
